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THE NEW EU “EXTRATERRITORIALITY”
JOANNE SCOTT*
Abstract
The established triggers for application of EU law – conduct, nationality
and presence – are being supplemented by novel “extraterritorial”
triggers that cause EU legislation to apply to conduct that occurs abroad.
This is apparent in the area of financial regulation. EU legislation that
relies on such triggers is neither self-evidently territorial nor
extraterritorial, and it remains unclear whether it is consistent with the
territorial principle of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this legislation also
usually includes “safety valves” in a bid to prevent jurisdictional
over-reach and to facilitate cooperation between States. These safety
valves should be viewed as of significance in assessing the legality of EU
legislation that incorporates novel “extraterritorial” triggers.
1. Introduction
Faced with the increasing challenges of an interconnected world and of
mitigating and managing the negative impacts within the EU of decisions and
practices occurring in other parts of the world, the EU has developed a broad
range of legislative techniques to regulate conduct that takes place outside the
EU’s borders.
In earlier work,1 I argued that the enactment of extraterritorial legislation by
the EU is extremely rare, but that the EU has frequent recourse to a legislative
technique that I labelled “territorial extension”. Territorial extension arises
where the EU uses the existence of a territorial connection with the EU
(notably, but not only, market access) to influence conduct that takes place
outside the EU. For example, the EU makes the access of aircraft to its
* Professor of European Law, University College London. This paper forms part of a
broader project exploring the global reach of EU law. Many thanks to Fergus Murray, Claire
Kilpatrick, Gráinne de Búrca, KennethArmstrong,An Hertogen, Margaret Young, Rosa Lastra
and Brendan Van Alsenoy for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and to the editors.
Thanks also to Frances Bodman for her excellent assistance in editing. Many thanks to the
Leverhulme Trust which has supported this work through the award of a Major Research
Fellowship (2012–2014).
1. Scott, “Extraterritoriality and territorial extension in EU law”, 62AJCL (2014), 87–126.
Common Market Law Review 51: 1343–1380, 2014.
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territory dependent on the worldwide safety record of the air carrier operating
the aircraft in question and on the overall safety performance of the regulatory
authorities in the air carrier’s home State.2
The present paper takes this work further by shifting from a broad analysis
of the substantive obligations contained in EU legislation to focus on the
specific “triggers” that spark the application of EU law. For the purpose of this
paper, a trigger is a mechanism that launches the application of EU law and
delimits its personal and territorial scope of application. For example, the
application of EU law may be triggered by the fact that a company is
incorporated in the EU or by the fact that a company is listed on a financial
market situated within the EU.3
Trigger selection often escapes intense political debate, but it bears heavily
on the questions of who incurs obligations under EU law and who acquires
rights. The focus of this paper is principally on the former question and is
concerned exclusively with the exercise of prescriptive or legislative
jurisdiction by the EU.
Traditionally, the EU has relied on three categories of trigger to justify
bringing individuals within the EU’s legislative or regulatory net: the fact that
a person engages in conduct in the EU, the fact that a person is legally or
physically present within the EU, or the fact that a person holds the nationality
of an EUMember State.Whereas conduct and presence are strongly linked to
the territorial principle, nationality forms a separate, well-established,
jurisdictional base. In general, most EU legislation has recourse to these
traditional triggers in order to guard against allegations of jurisdictional
excess.
More recently, however, the EU has deployed legislative triggers that serve
to extend the global reach of EU law and impose “over-the-border
obligations” on non-EU persons in relation to conduct that takes place entirely
abroad. The focus of this paper is on the emergence within the EU of novel
“extraterritorial” triggers of this kind. I have placed, and will continue to
place, the word “extraterritorial” within inverted commas in order to signal
the ambiguous and contested status of these triggers in territorial terms.
2. Reg. 2111/2005 on the establishment of a Community list of air carriers subject to an
operating ban within the Community and on informing air transport passengers of the identity
of the operating air carrier, O.J. 2005, L 344.
3. To give a concrete example, the Commission’s recent proposal to improve the gender
balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges is directed only
at companies that are both listed and incorporated in the EU. See COM(2012)614 final,
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council on improving the gender
balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related
measures.
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Where the EU has recourse to novel triggers of this kind, the line between
territorial jurisdiction and extraterritorial jurisdiction becomes difficult to
draw. While it is plain that the EU legislation in question regulates activities
that take place abroad, what is not straightforward is the determination of
whether the triggers that the EU is relying on should be understood as
territorial or not. This is important because although the concept of
extraterritoriality is often used as a slogan to cast doubt on the legitimacy of a
measure without unpacking what exactly this means, the concept of territory
has clear legal significance as well. Indeed, the territoriality principle is one of
the most important bases for the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction
recognized by customary international law.4 Consequently, where ameasure is
defined as extraterritorial, it will be unlawful unless an alternative, recognized
jurisdictional base can be found.5The legal significance of territory in EU law
is illustrated by the recent judgment of the ECJ in the Air Transport
Association of America case. Here, the ECJ upheld the legality of a measure
that encompassed conduct taking place outside EU territory, because the
trigger for the application of the measure was territorial in that the legislation
applied only to EU-arriving and-departing flights.6
Drawing on examples in EU legislation, this paper will argue that the
distinction between territorial and extraterritorial legislation is often unclear.
Those who are responsible for delimiting the boundaries of territorial
jurisdiction are often required to make a judgment about jurisdictional
reasonableness that entails a complex appraisal not only of the triggers
included in a specific piece of legislation but also of the legislative measure as
a whole. The paper suggests that the legitimacy and reasonableness accorded
to the particular use of “extraterritorial” triggers, and indeed the
characterization of a measure as extraterritorial or not, may have as much or
more to do with the design of the measure as it does with the abstract nature of
the triggers themselves. Moreover, an appraisal of relevant EU legislation
makes it possible to identify a number of design features that militate in favour
of accepting as legitimate “extraterritorial” legislation of this kind.
It is noteworthy that the emergence of these novel “extraterritorial” triggers
in EU law is linked to the global financial crisis. They form part of an
understandable legislative backlash against domestic, EU and global financial
markets characterized by “light touch” regulation and the socialization of
huge private losses through bail-out mechanisms, the costs of which are borne
by the taxpayer. One impact of the global financial crisis and of the associated
4. For a discussion see section 5.
5. Ibid.
6. Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America (ATAA) & Others v. Secretary of
State for Energy and Climate Change, [2011] ECR I-13755, paras. 131–130.
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eurozone crisis has been to impress upon regulators the precariousness of the
global financial system and the vulnerability of European banks to the
systemic crises that arise in far-off and seemingly economically distant places.
My earlier work pointed to the emergence of territorial extension in such
diverse fields as financial services, environment, aviation safety and security,
maritime transport and climate change. However, for the time being, the
incorporation of novel “extraterritorial” triggers into EU legislation seems to
be confined to the financial services domain.7 Nonetheless, as awareness of
the availability and significance of these triggers increases, there is potential
for them to be deployed in other areas of EU law as well.
The range, use and potential use of legislation that imposes over-the-border
obligations is growing and EU legislators, regulators and arbiters of
jurisdictional disputes need to equip themselves with a broad knowledge of
this rapid cycle of change. This is important in order to ensure that the checks
and balances built into EU law are up to the task of balancing the protection
and projection of EU interests and values against the dangers of jurisdictional
over-reach and the international tensions and blowback that follow.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 sets out the traditional and
novel triggers that have been included in EU legislation. Strange as it may
seem, the description, let alone analysis, of these has attracted little attention
in the academic literature and, in general, legislation is discussed only with
reference to its own substantive area of concern.8 This forecloses a broader
analysis that compares the range of triggers deployed across different areas in
EU law. The section concludes with examples of the global reach of the
legislative instruments incorporating triggers of this kind. Section 3 explores
the “safety valves” that are present in EU legislation incorporating novel
“extraterritorial” triggers, including mechanisms that inject “contingency”
and “contextuality” into the measures concerned. Section 4 takes the form of
a brief case study of the controversial, much contested, and still evolving
Financial Transaction Tax (FTT). By taking one piece of popular and populist
legislation – often called the “Robin Hood” tax – it is possible to tease out and
to expose some of the key considerations that go (and should go) into the
design and appraisal of legislation incorporating novel “extraterritorial”
triggers. Section 5 argues that the inclusion of adequate jurisdictional “safety
7. One possible exception to this in the area of maritime transport is Dir. 2005/35 on
ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties, particularly criminal penalties, for
infringements, O.J. 2005, L 255.This applies also to polluting discharges that occur on the high
seas.
8. For a notable exception, from the point of view of theories of private international law,
see Francq, “The scope of secondary Community law in the light of the methods of private
international law – or the other way around?”, 8 Yearbook of Private International Law (2006),
334.
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valves” in EU legislation incorporating novel “extraterritorial” triggers can
help to appraise the jurisdictional reasonableness of these measures and
should form part of a legality assessment conducted by the ECJ. Section 6
concludes.
2. Triggers old and new in EU law
This section starts with an analysis of those tried and tested legislative triggers
of conduct, presence and nationality, in turn founded on the well-established
customary international law principles of territory and nationality. However,
as we proceed it will become clear that the EU is moving into stranger and
more novel waters, under the stimulus of the financial storms that emerged in
the first decade of the 21st century.As a result, three new categories of trigger
have emerged. While this development points to continuing innovation and
experimentation on the part of the EU legislature, the diversity and fluidity of
the types of triggers that the legislature relies on within each of the broad
categories above strengthens that finding. An overview of the categories of
triggers that the EU legislature relies on is set out below.
Table I: Triggers Old and New in EU Law
Triggers
Established Conduct Nationality Presence
Novel Effects Anti-Evasion Transacting
with EU
person or
property
As a preliminary point, it is relevant to note that I do not discuss the so-called
“close connection” test in the context of the triggers identified below. While
this test has been relied on in the past by the EU to define the scope of
application of EU consumer protection legislation, a different trigger now
applies in relation to consumer contracts.9 The close connection test is
9. Consumers may not waive rights granted by the EU’s Consumer Rights Directive (Dir.
2011/83, O.J. 2011, L 304) where they are habitually resident in the EU and where the trader
pursues his professional or commercial activities in that country or directs his activities to that
country. SeeArt. 6(1) Reg. 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I),
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nonetheless still sometimes relied on by the ECJ in cases where EU legislation
is not explicit in defining its own scope of application.10
2.1. Triggers of old
2.1.1. Conduct
It is self-evident that obligations frequently attach to persons who engage in
conduct within the EU. The nature of the conduct required to trigger the
application of EU law will vary according to the objectives that the legislation
pursues.While the EU legislature relies on many different types of conduct to
justify the imposition of obligations, perhaps the single most important head
of jurisdiction in this category is market access or conduct that consists of a
step in the direction of gaining access to the EU market: for example, the
importation of a product, the marketing or placing on the market of goods or
services, or the performance of a commercial act that is directed at EU
consumers or investors such as sale, offer for sale or advertising. EU product
standards will almost invariably apply to imported as well as domestically
produced goods, and EU production process standards apply with increasing
regularity to goods that are imported into the EU as well.11
Of course, the concept of market access is a constructed concept, and its
parameters may occasionally be drawn in a way that leads to counter-intuitive
results and whichmay lead to the non-application of EU law to conduct within
the EU and to the application of EU law to conduct that takes place outside the
EU. For example, some measures deem services provided within the territory
of the EU to be regarded as not having been providedwithin the territory of the
EU where they are provided at the exclusive initiative of the person receiving
the service.12 This is because these clients are regarded as professional
investors and not requiring the protection that the measure confers. By
O.J. 2008, L 177/6. This trigger may be considered as falling under the heading of conduct
(market access) set out in section 3.1 infra. For a highly informative discussion of this see
Francq, op. cit. supra note 8.
10. See Case C-381/98, Ingmar GB v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., [2000] ECR
I-9305.Anticipating somewhat the discussion below, the close connection test may also serve as
a “territorially extending”, trigger as is evident from Case C-214/94, Boukhalfa v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [1996] ECR I-2253. The ECJ (at para 15) endorsed a broad
contextual standard, requiring the application of EU law to an employment relationship outside
the EU when the employment relationship has a sufficiently close link with the EU, including a
sufficiently close link with the law of an EU Member State.
11. For an unsuccessful attempt to impugn the legality of a measure regulating production
processes that excluded imported products from within its scope, see Case T-13/99, Pfizer
Animal Health v. Council, [2002] ECR II-3305, paras. 430–439.
12. SeeMarket in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR), Reg. 600/2014 on markets in
financial instruments, Art. 36(4) and recital 36, O.J. 2004, L 173. This will not cover situations
in which a third country firm solicits clients or potential clients in the EU or promotes or
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contrast, the provision of services by a third country entity to the third country
branch of an EU firm will sometimes be equated with market access even
though the services are provided outside the territory of the EU.13 This is
intended to protect EU entities and, ultimately, EU financial markets against
risk.
Access to the EU market may mean access to a general market or access to
a sub-market that has been constructed by EU law. For example, the EU
imposes obligations on credit rating agencies that provide ratings used for
“regulatory purposes”, in order to meet regulatory demands imposed by EU
law.14 Similarly, those supplying biofuels to the EU market will be obliged to
comply with the sustainability criteria laid down in EU legislation insofar as
these biofuels are to contribute to the attainment of a Member State’s
renewable energy target or are eligible to receive financial support.15
Whereas those taking steps to gain access to the EU’s market will routinely
incur obligations under EU law, those who export goods or services from the
territory of the EU are often exempt.16 For example, as a matter of law, the
product safety requirements included in the EU’s “new approach” directives
do not apply to goods that aremanufacturedwithin the EU for export abroad.17
There are, however, many pieces of EU legislation that do impose obligations
on persons exporting goods or services from the EU.This is especially the case
when the EU retains a security interest in the exported product or where
political protests lead the EU to accept responsibility for goods or services
exported abroad.18
advertises services or activities there. See similarly the definition of marketing in Art. 4(x) of
Dir. 2011/61 (O.J. 2011, L 174) on alternative investment fund managers (AIFM Directive).
13. See e.g. Reg. 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade
repositories (European market instruments regulation, “EMIR”), O.J. 2012, L 201, Art. 25(1).
14. Reg. 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, O.J. 2009, L 302, Art. 1.
15. Dir. 2009/28 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, O.J. 2009,
L 140, Art. 17.
16. For an attempt to impugn the legality of an EU measure because it included exported
products within its scope see Case C-491/01, R v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte British
American Tobacco (Investments) and imperial Tobacco Ltd, [2002] ECR I-11453.
17. See e.g. COM(2013)78 final, Product Safety and Market Surveillance Package,
Proposal for a Regulation on consumer product safety, Art. 1. Arts. 2(2) and (3) are explicit in
stating that this applies to products supplied for distribution, use or consumption on the EU
market and to the first making available of a product on the EUmarket. However, EU legislation
on consumer safety does accept that export bans may be put in place as a corollary to internal
measures prohibiting, suspending or restricting the placing or making available within the EU
of products that present a serious risk (See COM(2013)75 final, Product Safety and Market
Surveillance Package, Proposal for a Regulation on Market Surveillance of Products), Art.
12(1).
18. This is an interesting, important and complex topic, but it cannot be discussed fully
here. For an example of security-oriented export regulation, see Reg. 428/2009 setting up a
Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual- use items,
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Despite this emphasis on market access, there is considerable variation in
the kind of conduct that is relied on to trigger the application of EU law.
Notably, the EU has been obliged to adapt its definition of what counts as EU
conduct in order to keep up with developments in information and
communication technologies.
We see this, controversially, in the area of data protection where the 1995
Data Protection Directive imposed obligations on data controllers who made
use of equipment inside the EU for the purpose of processing personal data.19
This novel head has been construed broadly to include the collection of data
through the placing of cookies, or the use of JavaScript, ad banners or spyware,
on personal computers situated within the EU.20 However, over time it was felt
that the EU had cast its net too wide; in essence imposing obligations and
offering protection to persons with only a limited connection to the EU.21
Consequently, under a new proposal, data controllers established outside the
EU would only incur obligations where they process the personal data of
persons who reside within the EU (EU data subjects).22 The resulting
contraction in the zone of protection constructed by EU law sits uneasily with
the countervailing idea also expressed in this new proposal that the right to
data protection should apply to all natural persons, independent of their place
of residence or their nationality.23
The line separating conduct from other categories of jurisdictional trigger
can sometimes be difficult to draw. This is evident in the area of criminal
justice, where the physical presence within the EU of a perpetrator of a
criminal offence may be one key element in determining whether the
perpetrator’s conduct should be viewed as having occurredwithin the territory
O.J. 2009, L 134. For an example of export regulation that is driven by political protests see Reg.
1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment,
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, O.J. 2005, L 200.
19. Dir. 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, O.J. 1995, L 281, Art. 4(1)(c).
20. Art. 29 Working Party, “Working document on determining the international
application of EU data protection law to personal data processing on the Internet by non-EU
based websites” (WP, 56, 30 May 2002). For a critical discussion see Moerel, “The long arm of
EU data protection law: Does the data protection Directive apply to processing of personal data
of EU citizens by websites worldwide”, 1 International Data Privacy Laws (2011), 28–46.
21. Art. 29 Working Party, “Opinion 08/10 on applicable law”, 08/2010, p. 21.
22. COM(2012)11 final, Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the freemovement of such data,Art. 3(2) which
would impose obligations on data controllers who are not established in the EU but only where
they process the personal data of EU residents and where this processing relates either to the
offering of goods or services to EU residents or to the monitoring of their behaviour.
23. Ibid., recital 2.
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of the EU.24 We will see many other examples of the blurring of the lines
between jurisdictional categories in the examples set out below.
2.1.2. Nationality
EU law often imposes obligations on persons who enjoy the nationality of an
EU Member State. This includes both natural persons and legal persons;
including companies, aircraft,25 fishing vessels26 and ships.27While reference
will be made here to EU nationality, it is important to emphasize that
nationality is a derivative concept in the EU, based on the recognition of a
person’s status by an individual Member State.28 A natural person who holds
the nationality of a Member State is also accorded the status as an EU citizen
as a matter of EU law.29
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union sets out what is in
effect a nationality test for companies, for the purpose of delimiting the
availability of the right of freedom of establishment in the EU’s internal
market.30This right is enjoyed only by a company that is formed in accordance
with the law of an EUMember State and which has either its registered office,
its central administration or its principal place of business within the EU.
Many pieces of EU legislation incorporate triggers that are implicitly
nationality-based, imposing obligations on companies that have their
registered office31 or less often their head office (central administration)
within an EU Member State.32
EUmeasures often use the concept of establishment as the trigger to justify
the imposition of obligations on companies under EU law. While for
companies the concept of establishment may sometimes be equated with
24. See e.g. Dir. 2013/40 on attacks against information systems, O.J. 2013, L 218,
Art. 12(2).
25. This includes aircraft registered in an EU Member State.
26. This includes fishing vessels that fly the flag of an EU Member State and which are
registered in the Community Fishing Fleet Register.
27. This includes ships that fly the flag of an EU Member State.
28. Though note that the EU regulates the conditions under which Member States may
license air carriers, and thus confer nationality on them.Air carriers enjoy the nationality of the
Member State which has issued a valid operating licence. See Reg. 2407/92 on licensing air
carriers, O.J. 1992, L 240, esp. Arts. 2(b) and 4(1)(a).
29. See Art. 20(1) TFEU.
30. Art. 54 TFEU.
31. For just one example see the AIFM Directive, cited supra note 12, which defines an
alternative investment fund manager as an EU AIFM if the manager’s registered office is
situated in an EU Member State.
32. The AIFMDirective (ibid) considers anAlternative Investment Fund (AIF) to be an EU
AIF if it is authorized or registered in aMember State. If it is not authorized or registered, it will
nonetheless be considered an EUAIF if it has either its registered office or its head office in an
EU MS (Art. 2(k)).
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nationality, this is by no means always the case. The concept of establishment
is not always defined in EU legislation and where it is such definitions vary
widely.33 While some elements of a given definition may be relevant to an
assessment of a company’s nationality, such as the location of a company’s
registered office or head office, other elements may be viewed as pertaining
only to presence of the company within the Member State concerned.34
Nationality is the one “old” trigger that makes no claim to territoriality,35
and the exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction by a State over its
own nationals is uncontroversial as a matter of customary international law.
Nonetheless, the EU has stretched the boundaries of nationality jurisdiction
by regulating the wholly foreign conduct of companies that are incorporated
abroad, where these companies are subsidiaries of a parent company that holds
the nationality of an EU Member State.
Controversially, the EU has exercised “subsidiary jurisdiction” of this kind
in regulating the remuneration that may be paid to certain categories of staff
employed by banks and investment firms.36 The EU has famously introduced
a bankers’ “bonus cap” that fixes the variable element of remuneration at a
maximum of 100 percent of salary or twice this level with explicit shareholder
approval.37 These provisions concerning remuneration operate at “group,
parent company and subsidiary levels” including in relation to institutions that
are established in offshore financial centres, outside the EU.38 Consequently,
they apply not only to staff employed within banks and investment firms
within the EU (excluding the branches of third country firms), but also to staff
employed in the third country branches and subsidiaries of EU-headquartered
banks and investment firms.
The Commission is required to review the impact of compliance with the
bankers’ bonus rules in respect of its impact on any staff working effectively
33. See, AIFM Directive, ibid, Art. 4(j) (ibid.) which defines establishment by reference to
a variety of different concepts depending on the type of undertaking involved.
34. For example, where the concept of establishment is deemed to include the establishment
of a branch within the EU, this speaks to the presence of the company within the EU but not its
nationality.
35. See Lowe and Staker, “Jurisdiction” in Evans (Ed.), International Law. 3rd ed. (OUP,
2010) at p. 323, who observe that jurisdiction based on “the national principle” has “a longer
history than jurisdiction based on the territorial jurisdiction”.
36. Dir. 2013/36 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, O.J. 2013, L 176.The categories of staff
affected are set out in Art. 92(2) and the criteria are to be further elaborated by the European
BankingAuthority pursuant toArt. 94(2). This has traditionally been the preserve of the United
States and criticized by the EU. For a discussion seeThompson, “United States jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries: Corporate and international law aspects”, 15 Law and Policy in
International Business (1983), 319.
37. Dir. 2013/36, ibid., Art. 94(1)(g).
38. Ibid., Art. 92(1).
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and physically in the third-country subsidiaries of EU parent companies, and
to consider whether these restraints on variable remuneration should continue
to apply to this category of staff.39 The legality of the bankers’ bonus cap has
been challenged by the United Kingdom before the ECJ.40 The United
Kingdom has argued that “[t]o the extent that Article 94(1)(g) is required to be
applied to employees of institutions outside the EEA, it infringes Article 3(5)
TEU and the principle of territoriality found in customary international law”.
2.1.3. The presence of persons
i) Stable presence: Legal concepts, such as residence in relation to natural
persons and establishment (falling short of nationality) in relation to legal
persons, also form the basis for the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in EU
law. For example, any individual, partnership or legal entity that is resident or
established in the EUwill require a licence to provide brokering services from
the EU, where that person has been informed that the items they are trading in
are, or may be, intended for a weapon of mass destruction end use.41A natural
person may be deemed to be resident within the EU as a matter of law even
where that person is physically located abroad. Likewise, a corporation may
be legally established within the EU, even when the corporation’s officers are
engaged in activities outside the EU.
As noted previously, the concept of establishment can run the gamut from
nationality to stable presence. It may include the EU branches of companies
whose registered office and/or head office are outside the EU.42 It may even
extend to entities that enjoy a stable presence in the EU despite not having
opened even an EU branch. Establishment is understood in an extremely
flexible way in the EU’s original Data Protection Directive, which applies,
inter alia, where “the processing is carried out in the context of the activities
of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State”.43
Having regard to the Directive’s preamble and seeking guidance in the
freedom of establishment case law from the ECJ, the Article 29 Data
39. Ibid., Art.161(2)(b). It is required to do so by 30 June 2016 and, where appropriate, to
submit a legislative proposal taking international developments into account.
40. Case C-507/13, United Kingdom v. European Parliament & Council, pending.
41. See Reg. 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer,
brokering and transit of dual-use items, Arts. 4(1) and 5(1), cited supra note 18. For the
definition of brokering services see Art. 2(5).
42. Occasionally, the EU will make access to the EU market conditional on the
establishment of an EU branch. See Dir. 2014/65 (O.J. 2014, L 173) on markets in financial
instruments (MiFID II), Art. 41 in respect of investment firms providing services to retail
(non-professional) clients in the EU and Reg. 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, O.J. 2009, L
302, cited supra note 14, Art. 4(1).
43. Dir. 95/46, cited supra note 19,Art. 4(1)(a) on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
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Protection Working Party interpreted the concept of establishment as
consisting of the “effective and real exercise of activity through stable
arrangements” and desisted from emphasizing legal form.44 Nonetheless,
while an attorney’s office or agent would constitute an establishment, the
mere location of a server or computer in the territory of aMember State would
not.45
The ECJ has also recognized the Data Protection Directive’s “broad
territorial scope” and the important role that this plays in ensuring that
individuals are not deprived of the protection that they enjoy under the
Directive. This stems not only from the flexible concept of establishment in
the Directive, but also from the fact that it applies to data processing carried
out “in the context of the activities” of that establishment rather than “in” that
establishment. In the recent Google Spain case, the Court held that the
processing of personal data will be deemed to be carried out in the context of
the activities of an establishment of the data controller on the territory of a
Member State where the third country operator of a search engine has set up a
subsidiary within that Member State which is intended to promote and sell
advertising space offered by that search engine and which orientates its
activity towards the inhabitants of that Member State.46 This remains the case
even when the processing of personal data is carried out exclusively by the
parent company which does not itself have a corporate presence within the
EU, regardless it seems of where the data processing takes place. The ECJ
considered the activities of the operator of the search engine (the U.S.
company Google Inc.) and the activities of its Spanish subsidiary which sold
advertising space on its behalf, to be “inextricably linked”.47
EU law also imposes wide-ranging obligations on entities whose financial
instruments are listed or admitted to trading on a regulated market situated or
operating within an EU Member State.48 In this situation, the entity that has
44. Art. 29 Working Party Opinion 08/10, cited supra note 21, p. 11. In Case C-390/90,
Lease Plan Luxembourg v. Belgium, [1998] ECR I-2553, the ECJ did not accept that computer
equipment constitutes a virtual establishment.
45. Ibid, Art. 29 Working Party, pp. 11–12.
46. Case C-131/12, Google Spain Sl & Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD) & Mario Costeja González, judgment of 13 May 2014, paras. 54 and 61.
47. Ibid., para. 55.
48. It is important to have careful regard to the precise wording of the instrument in
question. E.g., the Commission’s recent proposal to improve the gender balance among
non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges is intended to ensure that 40%
of the non-executive directors of “publicly listed companies”, excluding small and medium
sized enterprises (SMEs), are women by 2020.As noted previously (supra note 3), the measure
would not extend to all publicly listed companies within the EU, but only to companies that are
both listed and incorporated in the EU.
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listed the financial instrument may be considered to have a stable presence
within the EU.
ii) Transient presence: The transient presence of persons within the EU
serves increasingly often as a trigger for the application of EU law.We see this
in relation to natural persons who may be required to obtain a visa before
crossing the external borders of an EUMember State, even when the person in
question enters EU territory for the purpose of transit and or for a short period
of time.49 We also see this in respect of EU regulation of international
transportation and in the fisheries conservation domain. In both of these, the
transient presence of third country aircraft, fishing vessels or ships will often
suffice to incur obligations under EU law.
To give an example: aircraft that are registered in a third country are
required by the EU to comply with international standards and EU standards
(when there are no international standards) when they fly into, within or out of
the EU.50 Ships that are flagged in a third country incur obligations under EU
law when they enter an EU port or offshore terminal, or anchor in waters
under the jurisdiction of an EU Member State.51 Likewise, third country
fishing vessels may not access an EU port or port services, except in case of
force majeure or distress, unless they meet the requirements laid down in the
EU regulation on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing).52
In shipping, the enhanced regulatory responsibilities of port States (as
opposed to flag States) is said to have greatly improved the enforcement of
standards that seek to reduce maritime pollution and improve ship safety.53
2.2. Novel triggers
In recent years, and particularly in the wake of the financial crisis, the EU
legislature has started to rely on a number of novel triggers that serve to extend
49. See Reg. 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of
a visa when crossing the external borders of an EUMember State and those whose nationals are
exempt from that requirement, O.J. 2001, L 81.
50. Reg. 2111/2005, cited supra note 2 and Reg. 216/2008, Art. 9 on common rules in the
field of civil aviation, O.J. 2005, L 344.
51. See e.g. Reg. 417/2002 on the accelerated phasing-in of double hull or equivalent design
requirements for single hull oil tankers, O.J. 2002, L 64 (repealed by Reg. 530/2012 on the
accelerated phasing-in of double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull oil
tankers, O.J. 2012, L 172) and Reg. 782/2003 on the prohibition of organizing compounds on
ships, both of which went further in their demands than the corresponding international
standards applicable at the time, O.J. 2003, L 115.
52. Reg. 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU
fishing, O.J. 2008, L 286, Art. 4(2).
53. Burrows, “Racing to the top… at last: The Regulation of safety in shipping” in Mattli
and Woods (Eds.), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2011), pp.
189–210.
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the global reach of EU law. The legislation that incorporates these triggers is
geographically agnostic in the sense that it applies also to conduct taking place
abroad.54 While this legislation is unequivocally extraterritorial in its reach
and gives rise to extraterritorial effects, it is far from clear whether the triggers
themselves should be viewed as extraterritorial or not. The question of the
territorial status of the triggers becomes all themore difficult as wemove from
the effects doctrine, which has recently been relied on explicitly by the EU
legislature for the first time, to the other novel triggers set out below.
2.2.1. Effects
The European Commission has argued for some time that EU rules on
competition should apply to third country undertakings when they engage in
anti-competitive practices that have an appreciable impact or effect within the
EU. Moreover, the General Court accepted that it would not be contrary to
public international law for the EU’s Merger Regulation to apply to mergers
between foreign undertakings when it is foreseeable that the merger will have
an immediate and substantial effect within the EU.55
Nonetheless, even in the area of merger control, for a merger to have a
“Community dimension” something more than a finding of effects is
required.56 The Merger Regulation makes EU jurisdiction over a merger
conditional on the undertakings in question exceeding both the worldwide and
EU turnover thresholds that it lays down.57 The EU turnover threshold will
only bemet when the undertakings sell the requisite level of goods or provides
the requisite level of services within the EU.58 The application of the EU
Merger Regulation is thus only triggered by EU conduct even though when
54. Many measures resting on a conventional territorial trigger also apply to conduct that
takes place abroad. This is the subject of my earlier piece on territorial extension in EU law,
cited supra note 1. That paper does not discuss some important new developments covered in
the present piece, such as the proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax addressed in sections
4–5 infra.
55. Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission, [1999] ECR II-753, para 90. In this judgment,
the General Court seems to use the effects doctrine to circumscribe rather than to expand EU
jurisdiction under the Merger Regulation. For a discussion seeWhish and Bailey, Competition
Law, 7th ed. (OUP, 2012), pp. 495–500. Note that the General Court was called the Court of
First Instance until 2009.
56. This is regulated by the EU Merger Regulation, Reg. 139/2004 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, O.J. 2004, L 24, Art. 1(2–3).
57. Ibid.
58. Direct sales within the EU are also considered to be relevant by the Commission in
demonstrating EU effects. Turnover is calculated in accordance with the rules laid down inArt.
5(4) of the Merger Regulation (cited supra note 56) and this involves the EU adopting a broad
understanding of the boundaries of the undertakings concerned, combining the turnover of all
affiliated entities.
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this conduct does occur, the EU will appraise mergers between foreign
undertakings that are concluded abroad.59
In competition law more generally, outside the area of merger control, the
ECJ has favoured an “implementation” test which enables the EU to exercise
jurisdiction when an anti-competitive agreement, decision or concerned
practice has been implemented within the EU.60 The ECJ has not yet clarified
what position it would take where there is no clear evidence of EU
implementation, butmerely evidence of direct, substantial and foreseeable EU
effects.
Although the jurisdictional status of effects has been discussed in the area
of EU competition law for some time,61 it is only recently that the EU
legislature has started to rely on the effects doctrine as an explicit basis for the
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. Most notably, the EU’s Regulation on
derivatives (European Market Instruments Regulation: EMIR) imposes
clearing and risk-mitigation obligations on persons concluding certain types
of derivatives contracts.62 Contracts that are concluded exclusively between
third country entities may be subject to these obligations where the contract in
question has a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU.This is,
to my knowledge, the first clear and express embodiment of the effects
doctrine contained in EU legislation.
The approach adopted in EMIR is mirrored in the more recently enacted
Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) which imposes an
obligation to trade certain classes of derivatives on a trading venue such a
regulated market, a multilateral trading facility or an organized trading venue,
rather than on an over-the-counter basis.63 Again, this trading obligation will
attach to third country entities where the contract in question has a direct,
substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU.64
59. Wagner-von Papp, “Competition law and extraterritoriality” in Ezrachi (Ed.), Research
Handbook on International Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 21–59.
60. See especially Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125–129/85, Ahlström
Osakeyhtiö and Others v. Commission (Woodpulp I), [1988] ECR 5193, paras. 16–18. In this
case, the Commission pushed for recognition of the effects doctrine whereas the Advocate
General pushed for recognition of a qualified form of effects, requiring evidence of direct,
substantial and foreseeable effects. The ECJ has also developed a “single economic entity” test
that allows it to use the EU presence of one undertaking to establish jurisdiction over related
firms abroad. See Case 48/69, ICI v. Commission, [1972] ECR 619.
61. For an early example of the Commission relying on the effects doctrine in the area of
competition law see Decision 69/243/CEE adopted on 24 July 1969.
62. Reg. 648/2012, cited supra note 13,Art. 4(1)(a)(v) in relation to the clearing obligation
and Art. 11(12) in relation to risk mitigation techniques.
63. MiFIR, cited supra note 12, Art. 24(1).
64. Ibid., Art. 24(2).
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The EU also relies on the effects doctrine in its Market Abuse Regulation
(MAR).65 This applies inter alia to transactions, orders to trade, and other
behaviour relating to financial instruments, including derivative products,
whose price or value has an effect on the price or value of a financial
instrument that is traded on a relevant market within the EU.66 The provisions
of this Regulation concerning market manipulation also apply to spot
commodity contracts (other than wholesale energy products) where a
transaction, order or behaviour has or is likely or intended to have an effect on
the price or value of a financial instrument that is traded within the EU.67
These provisions similarly apply to financial instruments which are not traded
on an EU market where a transaction, order or behaviour has or is likely to
have an effect on the price or value of a spot commodity contract and where
the price or value of this spot commodity contract depends on the price or
value of the financial instrument in question.68 This remains the case
regardless of whether the spot commodity contract in question pertains to
commodities for delivery outside the EU. In this situation, the effects of the
behaviour regulated by the EU would be diffuse, as this behaviour would
impact upon the stability of global commodity markets and commodity prices
worldwide, and not only within the EU.
The newMarketAbuse Regulation stands out even by comparison with the
EU’s Derivatives Regulation (EMIR). In EMIR, the breadth of the effects
doctrine is circumscribed by the requirement that effects must be “direct,
substantial and foreseeable”. In the Market Abuse Regulation, the qualifiers
are less pronounced. While the effects in question must be at least “likely” or
“intended”, there is no need for the EU to demonstrate that they must be either
significant or direct. Indeed, where effects within the EU are mediated via the
impact of behaviour on global commodity markets, these effects may be
thought to be indirect. The absence of an intensity of effects threshold in this
Regulation is rendered somewhat less important as a result of the definition of
insider information laid down. For information to be capable of constituting
inside information, it must be capable of having a significant effect on the
price of financial instruments.69 While no similar proviso exists as far as the
65. Reg. 596/2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation or MAR), O.J. 2014, L 173.
See alsoArt. 28(1)(b) of Reg. 236/2012 (O.J. 2012, L 86) on short selling and certain aspects of
credit default swaps which allows ESMA to intervene in exceptional circumstances in respect
of behaviour relating to financial instruments that poses a threat to the functioning and integrity
of financial markets in the EU or to the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in
the EU.
66. Ibid., MAR, Art. 1(1)(d).
67. Ibid., MAR, Art. 1(2) (a).
68. Ibid., MAR, Art. 2(2)(b).
69. See the definition in ibid., MAR, Art. 7.
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definition of market manipulation is concerned, even here the preamble
stresses the capacity of market manipulation to have a “significant impact on
the prices of financial instruments in a relatively short period of time”70 In the
light of this, it seems probable that a requirement that effects be significant
(though not necessarily direct) would be read into this instrument by the
European Court.
2.2.2. Anti-evasion
Recourse to the effects doctrine in the EU’s Derivatives Regulation (EMIR) is
accompanied by a novel trigger that is intended to catch artificial behaviour
designed to evade obligations laid down in EU law. This has the effect of
requiring third country entities to comply with the measure’s clearing and risk
mitigation obligations where this is necessary or appropriate to prevent the
evasion of any provision of this Regulation.71
As with the inclusion of the effects doctrine in EMIR, this anti-evasion
trigger was included late in the legislative process at the behest of the
European Parliament.72 Recourse to both the effects doctrine and to the
anti-evasion trigger was stated, rather vaguely, to be intended to foster
financial stability within the EU.73 As we will see below, the Commission is
empowered to adopt delegated legislation clarifying which kinds of contract
will be caught by a trigger of this kind.
Also, as noted previously, the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation
(MiFIR) imposes a trading obligation on certain classes of derivatives
contracts, and specifies the type ofmarkets these contractsmay be traded on.74
This obligation will bite inter alia where this is necessary or appropriate to
prevent the evasion of any provision of this Regulation.75
In addition, in this setting, the European Securities and Market Authority
(ESMA) is charged with regularly monitoring activities in derivatives
which have not been declared subject to the trading obligation as described in
Article 24(1) MiFIR in order to identify cases where a particular class of
contractsmay pose a systemic risk and to prevent regulatory arbitrage between
derivative transactions subject to the trading obligation and derivative
transactions which are not subject to the trading obligation.76 The recognition
70. Ibid., MAR, recital 47 (emphasis added).
71. Reg. 648/2012, cited supra note 13,Art. 4(1)(a)(v) in relation to the clearing obligation
and Art. 11(12) in relation to risk mitigation techniques.
72. See Position of European Parliament adopted at first reading on 29 March 2012
(EP-PE_TC1-COD(2010)0250).
73. Reg. 648/2012, cited supra note 13, recital 23.
74. MiFIR, cited supra note 12, Art. 24(1).
75. Ibid., Art. 24(2).
76. Ibid.
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in this setting of the importance of continuously monitoring activities in order
to be in a position to take steps to mitigate the threat of regulatory arbitrage is
of potentially great importance. We will see in relation to the proposed
financial transaction tax below, that the challenge of ensuring that effective
regulation does not come at the cost of reduced competitiveness and the global
relocation of economic enterprise may to some extent be addressed by having
recourse to novel “extraterritorial” triggers that serve to bring foreign
corporations and their foreign activities within the scope of application of EU
law.
2.2.3. Transacting with an EU person or property
Apersonmay incur obligations under EU law not as a result of their own status
but as a result of the status of the person or property with whom or with which
they transact. In this situation, the person incurring an obligation under EU
will have an indirect connection with the EU as a result of the relationship that
they have formed with a person or property that has been deemed to be
sufficiently closely connected with the EU.
i) The counterparty principle.As was observed above, the EU’s Derivatives
Regulation (EMIR) imposes obligations on parties concluding OTC
derivatives contracts.A clearing obligation will attach to third country entities
when they enter into a relevant contract with an EU (financial) counterparty.77
Here, the third country counterparty is viewed as enjoying an indirect
connection with the EU, by virtue of its decision to enter into a transaction
with a counterparty that is authorized or established within the EU. This
indirect connection is treated as sufficient to justify the imposition of
obligations under EU law.
There are many pieces of legislation that make the fact that a person enters
into a transaction with, or engages in other behaviour in relation to, a person
who holds the nationality of an EU Member State or who resides within its
territory, relevant in determining whether the legislation applies.78 However, it
is almost invariably the case that for a non-EU person to incur obligations as
77. Reg. 648/2012, cited supra note 13, Art. 4(1)(a)(iv). Recall the definition of financial
counterparty and non-financial counterparty inArt. 2(7) and (8). Counterparties falling within
these definitions may be considered to be EU counterparties. For another recent example see
Dir. 2014/59, cited infra note 80, concerning bank/financial insolvency proceedings.Art. 69(3)
allows resolution authorities to suspend payment or delivery obligations under a contract
entered into by an institution under resolution, including the payment and delivery obligations
of that institution’s counterparties.
78. In fact, one of the examples included in section 2.1.1 supra concerning EU conduct
could also have been classified as resting on a trigger falling into the category of “transacting
with an EU-connected person”. See Reg. 648/2012,Art. 25, cited supra note 13, which imposes
obligations on third country CCPs which provide services to EU-established customers,
including where those customers are third country branches of EU firms.
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a result, theymust themselves also engage in some element of EU conduct.We
see this in the consumer protection example referred to above.79 For the rights
conferred by the Consumer Rights Directive to be treated as imperative rights,
not onlymust the consumer reside habitually within the EU but the tradermust
also pursue his professional or commercial activities in the consumer’s
country of habitual residence or direct his activities to that Member State. The
EU’s Derivatives Regulation (EMIR) is consequently distinctive, in that the
mere fact of entering into a transaction with an EU-connected person is
sufficient to spark the application of EU law.
We see the counterparty principle in action also in the EU’s new Bank
Resolution Directive (BRD).80 Here, foreign counterparties do not incur
obligations under the Directive as such, but they can be deprived of rights that
they would otherwise enjoy in their contractual relations with “wobbly” EU
investment firms or banks.81 For example, foreign counterparties may be
temporarily suspended from terminating contracts with banks “under
resolution” or they may find themselves subject to a “bail-in” whereby they
are required to endure a write-down of some of the debt owed to them by the
financial institution in question.82
ii) The property principle. Reliance on the property principle as a
jurisdictional trigger occurs when the EU exercises jurisdiction over
transactions on the basis that the property involved in those transactions has a
close and specified link with the EU. Where the EU relies on the property
principle, the identity of the parties engaging in a transaction is not
jurisdictionally salient and nor is the location in which the transaction takes
place. In each of the examples set out below, the property that forms the basis
for the exercise of jurisdiction by the EU takes the form of financial
instruments including, for example, sovereign debt or shares.
In 2012, the EU enacted a Short Selling Regulation.83 This imposes
notification and disclosure requirements on entities which hold net short
positions in shares and imposes restrictions on uncovered short sales.84 It does
so in relation to shares that are admitted to trading on a trading venue in the
EU, even where the shares in question are traded outside this or any other
79. Recall supra note 9.
80. Dir. 2014/59 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit
institutions and investment firms, O.J. 2014, L 173.
81. I borrow the term “wobbly” from Peter Werner, Senior Director at ISDA, who used this
term during his presentation at the British Institute for International and Comparative Law on
10 July 2014.
82. Ibid., Arts. 71, 63(1)(e) and note the important caveat in Art. 67(2) regarding assets
located in third countries and transactions that are governed by foreign law.
83. Reg. 236/2012,cited supra note 65.
84. Ibid., Arts. 5, 6 & 12.
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trading venue.85 It does not matter who is trading in the shares in question or
where the transaction takes place. It is the connection that is forged between
the shares and the EU – at the point when the shares are admitted to trading on
an EU trading venue – that triggers the application of EU law. This is subject
to an exemption that applies when the principal venue for the trading of the
shares in question is located in a third country rather than the EU.86
The Short Selling Regulation also imposes notification obligations on
persons who hold net short positions in sovereign debt and restrictions on
uncovered sales in sovereign debt and on uncovered sovereign credit default
swaps.87 Sovereign debt is defined as a debt instrument issued by a sovereign
issuer, such as the EU, aMember State or an international financial institution
established by two or more Member States for the purpose of mobilizing
funding and providing financial assistance to the benefits of Member States
that are experiencing or threatened by severe financing problems.88
The EU’s Market Abuse Regulation is also relevant to understanding the
role that property may play as a basis for the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction in EU law. 89 This measure prohibits insider trading and market
manipulation, and imposes additional obligations on a range of actors
including issuers of financial instruments, market operators and persons who
professionally arrange transactions in financial instruments. The Regulation
applies to financial instruments that are admitted to trading on a regulated
market in at least one Member State, or for which a request for admission has
been made, as well as financial instruments that are traded on a multilateral
trading facility or an organized trading facility in at least one EU Member
State.90 It also extends to financial instruments whose price or value depends
on or has an effect on the price or value of a financial instrument traded on an
EU market.91 Significantly, from a territorial point of view, this Regulation
applies to all these EU-connected instruments (property), even when they are
being traded outside an EU trading venue, including in relation to transactions
that take place abroad.92
85. A trading venue is a regulated market or a multilateral trading facility.
86. Reg. 236/2012, cited supra note 65, Art. 16. A list of such shares will be published by
ESMA every two years.
87. Ibid., Arts. 7,13 and 14.
88. Ibid., Art. 2(1)(f) and Art. 2(1)(d).
89. Reg. 596/2014, MAR, cited supra note 65. This was preceded by Dir. 2003/6 on insider
dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), O.J. 2003, L 96.
90. Ibid., Art. 2(1)(a-c).
91. Ibid., Art. 2(1)(d).
92. Ibid., Art. 2(1)(c).
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2.3. The global reach of EU law
The previous section of this paper has exposed the rich variety of triggers that
the EU relies on to provide the jurisdictional foundation to support the
application of its laws. It not only highlighted the emergence of new heads of
jurisdiction within existing categories, but the emergence of novel categories
as well. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the EU has had recourse to
triggers that were previously unknown in EU legislation, including effects,
anti-evasion, the counterparty principle and the property principle.
Themost striking feature of legislation that relies on novel “extraterritorial”
triggers of this kind is the fact that it regulates conduct that takes place entirely
abroad.93 Moreover, it does so even when the person engaging in the foreign
conduct in question is neither a national of an EUMember State nor physically
or legally present within the EU. Consequently, recourse to these novel
triggers serves to expand the global reach of EU law, bringing within its scope
behaviour that would previously have been regulated exclusively by other
States, for example by the State within whose territory the conduct in question
occurred.Table II below summarizes the global reach of EU legislation of this
kind.
Table II: The Global Reach of EU Law
Instrument Trigger EU Obligation Foreign Conduct
EU Derivatives
Regulation
(EMIR)
Effects;
anti-evasion;
counterparty
principle
Clearing and risk
mitigation
techniques
OTC derivatives
contracts
concluded abroad
Market in
Financial
Instruments
Regulation
(MiFIR II)
Effects;
anti-evasion.
Trading
obligation
OTC derivatives
contracts
concluded abroad
93. It bears repeating that some measures that rest on territorial triggers also regulate
conduct that takes place outside the EU. This is illustrated by both the ATAA and the Google
Spain cases, cited supra notes 6 and 46.
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Instrument Trigger EU Obligation Foreign Conduct
Short Selling
Regulation
Transactions
involving EU
property
Transparency
requirements and
restrictions
Persons outside
EU holding
significant net
short positions
and entering into
uncovered short
sales
Market Abuse
Directive and
Regulation
(MAD and
MAR)
Transactions
involving EU
property;
effects
Prohibition on
market
manipulation
Behaviour
constituting
market
manipulation that
takes place
abroad
Bank Resolution
Directive (BRD)
Counterparty
principle
No termination
of contracts with
banks under
resolution and
possibility of
“bail-in” of
foreign
counterparties
Transactions
concluded abroad
by foreign
counterparties
3. “Safety valves” and jurisdictional self-restraint
It is clear from the overview presented above that the EU has increasing
recourse to novel triggers that serve to extend the global reach of EU law and
which enable it to govern conduct that takes place entirely abroad. EU
legislation of this kind is liable to occupy regulatory spaces that are occupied
also by other States. Where the EU regulates foreign conduct, it will often be
the case that this conduct is also regulated by the State in which it occurs. As
a result, recourse to novel “extraterritorial” triggers increases the prevalence
of overlapping claims to authority by different States and of individuals being
subject to multiple and sometimes conflicting laws.
The rationale for EU reliance on “extraterritorial” triggers of this kind is
quite clear. These measures seek to protect EU persons and public authorities
from financial risks, to protect the stability and integrity of EU financial
markets or to prevent the sovereign authority of the EU from being
undermined as a result of steps taken by individuals to evade the application of
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its laws.Also, in the case of the proposedMarketAbuse Regulation, the EU is
concerned to promote the integrity of global commodity markets, in view of
the fact that these global markets also set commodity prices within the EU.
Thus, recourse to these novel triggers in the financial services sphere reflects
the truly global nature of financial markets and the vulnerability of EU
governments, investors and consumers in the face of high risk or systemically
risky behaviour that takes place elsewhere.
While the rationale for the adoption of measures that incorporate
“extraterritorial” triggers may be clear, the jurisdictional basis for such
measures is not. These measures are neither self-evidently territorial or
extraterritorial and it is far from clear whether these triggers can be viewed as
consistent with the territorial principle that is recognized by customary
international law.
It is significant in the light of this to observe that the EU measures that
incorporate “extraterritorial” triggers also frequently incorporate
jurisdictional “safety valves” that are intended to prevent jurisdictional
over-reach and to facilitate cooperation and to reduce conflict between States.
This section examines the two most significant jurisdictional safety valves
that the EU has put in place.94 These are sometimes deployed individually in
EU legislation and sometimes combined.
These twomechanisms – labelled “contingency” and “contextuality” here –
imply a degree of jurisdictional restraint on the part of the EU and can be
viewed as an expression of the proportionality principle in legal instruments
that create over-the-border obligations. These mechanisms also create
opportunities for continuing dialogue between the EU and third country
regulators and entities, setting in train a discursive process rather than an
emphatic, one-sided and uncompromising “extraterritorial” application of EU
rules.
3.1. Contingency
The concept of contingency is intended to capture the tentative or provisional
nature of the EU’s claim to regulatory authority. Contingency implies that
94. Note also the inclusion of an additional safety valve in relation to the bankers’ bonus
cap. The Commission is required to review the impact of compliance with the bankers’ bonus
rules in respect of its impact on “any staff working effectively and physically” in the third
country subsidiaries of EU parent companies and to consider whether these restraints on
variable remuneration should continue to apply to this category of staff. It is required to do so
by 30 June 2016 and, where appropriate, to submit a legislative proposal taking international
developments into account (see Art. 161(2)(b), Dir. 2013/36, cited supra note 36). See also
Arts. 45(5) and 67(2) of the BRD (supra note 80) for a strong expression of EU reticence in
relation to third country assets or transactions governed by foreign law.
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while the EU is increasingly willing to insist upon the application of its
legislation to conduct that takes place abroad, it is also willing to consider
“disapplying” this legislation when the foreign conduct in question has been
satisfactorily regulated by another State or by an international body.
The EU’s Derivatives Regulation (EMIR) offers a textbook example of
contingency of this kind.95 Here, the Commission is empowered to adopt
decisions declaring that the legal, supervisory and enforcement arrangements
of a third country are equivalent to those laid down in EMIR and that these
third country arrangements are being effectively applied and enforced in an
equitable and non-distortive manner so as to ensure effective supervision and
enforcement in that third country. Where at least one counterparty to a
derivatives contract is established in a third country that benefits from an
equivalence decision of this kind, all of the counterparties to the contract will
be deemed to have fulfilled the specified obligations under EU law.96
Consequently in this setting, equivalence leads to the “disapplication” of EU
law not only in relation to third country entities but in relation to the EU
entities with which they transact as well. Also, notably, the disapplication of
EU law does not depend upon there being evidence of the existence of a
genuine conflict between EU and third country law.97
Contingency as equivalence is of significance in both procedural and in
substantive terms. Procedurally, while it is ultimately for the EU to make an
equivalence determination before disapplying its own laws,98 it is nonetheless
clear that equivalence creates opportunities for intensive dialogue and for the
exchange of information and views between EU and third country
95. Regulation 648/2012, cited supra note 13, See especially Art. 13(2) laying down a
“mechanism to avoid duplicative or conflicting rules”, including in relation to the clearing and
risk mitigation obligations in Art. 4(1) and Art. 11. More unusual is the Short Selling
Regulation Reg. 236/2012, cited supra note 65, which provides for the disapplication of EU law
where the principal trading venue for the shares in question is in a third country, regardless of
whether that third country has equivalent laws in place.
96. Ibid., Reg. 648/2012, cited supra note 13, Art. 13(3).
97. This is because in this setting contingency is indeed to prevent duplicative as well as
conflicting requirements. This stands in contrast to Art. 37 of the AIFM Directive (cited supra
note 12) concerning the authorization of non-EU alternative investment fund managers which
lays downwhat may be labelled a conflict equivalence clause.This permits the disapplication of
EU law in favour of equivalent third country law only where it is impossible to combine
compliance with EU and third country law.
98. The relevant legislative instrument will lay down the procedure to be followed. In
EMIR, an equivalence determination is adopted by the Commission by way of the examination
procedure set out in Art. 86(2) Reg. 648/2012, cited supra note 13. The Commission has
mandated ESMA to provide it with technical advice beforemaking a determination of this kind.
See by way of recent example, ESMA, Final report, Technical advice on third country
regulatory equivalence under EMIR – US (1 Sept. 2013, ESMA/2013/1157).
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regulators.99 Equivalence determinations may be unilateral acts but they are
nonetheless adopted within a framework of close and continuous
collaboration between the EU and the third countries concerned.100
Substantively, the EU claims to follow an “objective-based approach”,
which emphasizes functional equivalence rather than the existence of
identical rules.101 It is about comparability in terms of the capacity of third
country measures to achieve the EU’s objectives rather than the precise
content of a third country’s rules. There are signs that the EU is willing to be
flexible in the conduct of its equivalence assessments. To give just one recent
example, in assessing the equivalence of U.S. measures under EMIR, ESMA
demonstrated a willingness to take into account not only legally binding
measures adopted by the US, but also the “internal policies, procedures, rules,
models andmethodologies” put in place by private actors, where these internal
policies cannot be changed without the approval of the regulatory authorities
and when a failure to implement these internal policies can give rise to
enforcement action by the State.102
3.2. Contextuality
It is often the case that when the EU relies on novel “extraterritorial” triggers,
these triggers take the form of contextual standards rather than rules.
Contextual standards render the application of EU law conditional on a
case-by-case, contextual, assessment of whether the criteria established by an
open-ended standard have been met in a specific set of circumstances, rather
than on the application of a more clearly delimited but more rigid rule. This is
the case with the “effects” and “anti-evasion” triggers that were highlighted
above. There are two manifestations of contextuality inherent in the Market in
Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR). First, this includes both effects
and anti-evasion as free-standing contextual triggers. Second, it imposes an
obligation on ESMA tomonitor derivatives transactions that are not subject to
the trading obligation in order to identify additional cases that may pose a
systemic risk and to prevent regulatory arbitrage.103
99. Note, for example, ESMA’s remarks in the Final Report, ibid, para 4 (p. 6).
100. In the context of EU recognition of U.S. equivalence under EMIR, EU Commissioner
Barnier is reported to have said “our discussions have been long and sometimes difficult, but
they have always been close, continuous and collaborative talks between partners and friends”.
See CFTC Press Release PR-6640 of July 11, 2013, ‘The European Commission and the CFTC
reach a Common Path Forward on Derivatives’ at: <www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/
pr6640-13> (last visited 18 July 2014).
101. For one example see Final Report, cited supra note 98, para 4.
102. Final Report, cited supra note 98, paras. 78–80 concerning central counterparties.
103. MiFIR (Reg. 600/2014), cited supra note 12.
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While contextual standards of this kind may create uncertainty about the
circumstances in which EU law will apply, including in relation to wholly
foreign conduct, they place a burden on the EU to bring forth the contextual
evidence necessary to demonstrate that the criteria embodied in the contextual
standard have been met. Contextual standards thus place a continuing duty of
reasoned justification on the EU in a bid to ensure that the application of EU
law is really necessary in view of the objectives pursued by the legislation in
question. Seen in this way, contextual standards may be viewed as giving
effect to the proportionality principle, in that they impose an obligation on the
EU to justify the application of EU law on a case-by-case basis and serve to
guard against the danger of an over-inclusive rule.
That said, in view of the risk contextual standards may pose to legal
certainty, they are often embedded within a governance framework that
provides for their further elaboration. We see this most clearly in the EU
Derivatives Regulation (EMIR).This imposes an obligation on ESMA to draft
regulatory technical standards specifying which kinds of derivatives contracts
may be considered to have a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within
the EU and the cases in which it may be necessary or appropriate to prevent
the evasion of any provision of the Regulation.104 These regulatory technical
standards may be adopted by the Commission as a Delegated Regulation in
accordance with the procedure laid down.105
The adoption of Delegated Regulations of this kind may blur the line
between contextual standards (such as effects) and rules (such as stable
presence within the EU). Again, this is apparent from the example of EMIR
where the contextual standard in the form of “effects” has in essence been
translated into two distinct rules. Contracts will be deemed to have a direct,
substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU where at least one third
country entity benefits from an appropriate guarantee provided by a financial
counterparty established in the EU (a counterparty principle of sorts) or where
two third country entities enter into a contract through their branches in the EU
(stable presence within the EU).106 This stands in contrast to ESMA’s
elaboration of the “anti-evasion” trigger, where it adopts a “criteria based”
rather than a “prescriptive list” approach. A contract shall be deemed to fall
within the anti-evasion trigger when it has as its primary purpose the
104. Reg. 648/2012, supra note 13, Arts. 4(4) and 11(14)(e).
105. Ibid. The procedure is laid down in Arts. 10–14 of Reg. 1095/2010 establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Market Authority), O.J. 2010, L
331.
106. Art. 2 Commission Delegated Regulation 285/2014 (O.J. 2014, L 85) supplementing
Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to
regulatory technical standards on direct, substantial and foreseeable effects of contracts within
the Union and to prevent the evasion of rules and obligations, O.J. 2012, L 201.
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avoidance of the application of any provision of the Regulation; namely where
its primary purpose is to defeat the object, spirit and purpose of the
Regulation, including when it is part of an artificial arrangement that
intrinsically lacks business rationale, commercial substance or relevant
economic justification.107 Thus, in the case of this second novel
“extraterritorial” trigger, its contextual nature remains pronounced even
following the adoption of delegated legislation elaborating upon its scope.
It nonetheless remains the case that even in the wake of the adoption of
delegated regulations the scope of application of legislation embodying
contextual standards remains fluid because it may always be refined or altered
in the future by the adoption of further delegated legislation. The adoption of
delegated regulationsmerely creates provisional agreement about ameasure’s
scope of application, but the contours of that agreement may shift in the light
of experience in the application of the measure concerned.108
From the point of view of enhancing cooperation and avoiding conflict
with other States, it is significant to note that where contextual standards are
embeddedwithin a governance framework providing for their elaboration, this
framework will provide opportunities for regulators and potentially affected
entities in third countries to seek to influence the nature of the provisional
agreement about how the contextual standards in question should be
construed. As with equivalence, the process of refining the contours of
contextual standards encourages a dialogue between “insiders” and
“outsiders”. This is clearly apparent in relation to EMIR. Here, ESMA
publicly consulted on the possible content of its draft regulatory technical
standards on two occasions, over a period of more than eighteen months.109
When it published its Final Report setting out its draft regulatory technical
standards, ESMA included information concerning the feedback received
from stakeholders and detailed the changes to its draft standards that this
feedback had induced.110 ESMA’s draft regulatory technical standards were
107. ESMA, Final Report, “Draft technical standards under EMIR on contracts with a
direct, foreseeable and substantial effect within the Union and anti-evasion”, paras. 48& 49 (15
Sept. 2013, ESMA/2013/1657) and Art. 3 of the Commission Delegated Regulation, ibid.
108. In this setting, it would be appropriate for the ECJ to impose an obligation to conduct
a regular review of the scope of the contextual standard in question. For an example of the Court
imposing an obligation of this kind in a different setting see Case C-127/07, Société Arcelor
Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, [2008] ECR I-9895, para 62.
109. Final Report, cited supra note 107, para 5.
110. Ibid., pp. 6–13. For one example, see para. 25 concerning the removal of the term
“legally enforceable” from the text of the standards.
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broadly welcomed within the sector and were viewed as narrowing the
“extraterritorial” impact of EMIR outside the EU.111
Thus far, this paper has discussed the design and application of legislative
triggers that enhance the global reach of EU legislation and the safety valves
that are built into this legislation by the principles of contingency and
contextuality. We now turn to the case of the proposed Financial Transaction
Tax to look at the triggers and safety valves this controversial Commission
proposal incorporates.
4. Extraterritoriality and the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT)
Of all the EU measures – actual and proposed – that rest on novel
“extraterritorial” triggers, the most controversial is the Commission’s
proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT).112 As proposed, this would
impose a levy of 0.1 per cent on stock and bond trades and 0.01 percent on
derivatives transactions. In its current guise, and pursuant to the Treaty’s
enhanced cooperation procedure,113 the FTT would apply in eleven Member
States (the participating Member States or the EU-11).114
According to the counterparty principle, a financial institution will be
deemed to be establishedwithin a participatingMember State and hence liable
to pay the FTT, when it is party, or acting in the name of a party, to a financial
transaction with an EU-11 institution or with an institution that has a stable
presence within the EU-11.115 In this scenario, a financial institution is
deemed to be established within the EU-11 because of the connection that it
has formed with an institution that has a direct nationality-based or territorial
connection with a participating Member State.
The counterparty principle is complemented by the “issuance principle”,116
which is represented by the Commission as being a trigger of last resort.117
This is a property principle in terms of the scheme presented above.According
111. For just one example see PWC, “FS regulatory briefing: EMIR proposals narrow
impact outside EU” (Aug., 2013).
112. COM(2013)71 final proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced
cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax. For an earlier proposal see COM(2011)594
final.
113. See Art. 329(1) TFEU and Council Decision 2013/52 authorizing enhanced
cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax.
114. These are Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy,Austria, Portugal,
Slovenia and Slovakia.
115. COM(2013)71 final, cited supra, note 112, Art. 4(1)f). Art. 4(1)(a-e) define what I
mean here by an EU institution or an institution with a stable EU presence.
116. Ibid., Art. 4(1)(g).
117. Ibid., p. 11.
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to this principle, a financial institution or a non-financial institution will be
deemed to be established within the EU-11 when it is party to a transaction, or
acting in the name of a party to a transaction, involving a structured product or
financial instrument that has been issued within the EU-11. For example, a
party entering into a transaction involving Volkswagen shares would be taxed
regardless of whether that party is an EU national or is legally or physically
present within the EU; and regardless of where in the world the transaction
takes place. The concept of issuance is not defined in the proposal, but the
impact assessment accompanying this clarifies that the place of issuance is the
place in which the issuer of the structured product or financial instrument
resides.118 The issuance principle was included for the first time in the 2013
proposal, and it is intended to “improve the resilience of the system against
relocation”,119 making it “less advantageous” for entities to relocate activities
or establishments outside the territory of participating Member States.120
The counterparty principle and the issuance principle have proved to be
controversial in the context of the FTT. Both London and Washington have
declared their intent to fight the tax to ensure it does not over-reach the
eurozone and tax or double-tax legitimate activity outside its borders.121 In
addition, the United Kingdom challenged the legality of the Council’s
Decision to authorize enhanced cooperation arguing, inter alia, that the
Decision authorized the adoption of an FTT with extraterritorial effects and
that this was contrary to customary international law.122 As has been widely
reported, the ECJ dismissed the UK’s challenge as premature, concluding that
the principles of taxation challenged by the UK did not form part of the
Council’s preliminary decision to authorize enhanced cooperation.123
Nonetheless, read against the background provided in section 1.2 above, it
is clear that neither the counterparty principle nor the issuance principle is
unprecedented as a matter of EU law. The counterparty principle is also
included in the EU’s Derivatives Regulation (EMIR), and recourse to a
property principle finds expression in existing legal instruments that impose
obligations on persons who enter into transactions involving financial
instruments that are listed within the EU. While the FTT is distinctive in its
emphasis upon the place of issuance of a financial instrument rather than upon
its place of listing, even here it overlaps with the Short Selling Regulation to a
118. SWD(2013)28 final, Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a directive
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, p. 40.
119. Ibid., p. 5.
120. Ibid.
121. Barket and Politi, “Brussels Proposes ¤30bn “Tobin Tax”, Financial Times (14 Feb.
2013).
122. Case C-209/13, United Kingdom v. Council, judgment of 30 Apr. 2014, nyr.
123. Ibid, para 36.
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certain extent.124 As was noted above, the Short Selling Regulation imposes
obligations on persons who enter into a transaction involving sovereign debt
issued by a Member State of the EU.
In the light of this, the triggers relied on by the Commission in its FTT
proposal are of a kind that fall within the categories of novel “extraterritorial”
triggers identified above.While the FTT triggers are distinctive in a number of
subtle ways, they do not seem sufficiently different to explain the intensity of
the opposition that this proposal has generated both at home and abroad.
Nonetheless, the FTT proposal is different from other EU measures
incorporating novel “extraterritorial” triggers. This is due less to the nature of
the triggers themselves, and more to the absence or inadequacy of the safety
valves that this proposal includes. While EU measures incorporating novel
“extraterritorial” triggers tend to be characterized by a high degree of
“contingency”, often through the inclusion of an equivalence clause, the FTT
proposal is not. On the contrary, the proposal does not contemplate the
“disapplication” of EU-11 law in favour of the law of a non-participating
Member State or a third country where one counterparty, or indeed the
transaction as whole, has been made subject to a comparable or comparably
effective financial transaction tax elsewhere.125 The absence of a safety valve
in the form of an equivalence clause raises a suspicion that the Commission
regards the FTT’s revenue-raising objective as paramount, as this is the only
one of the proposal’s stated objectives that could not, in principle, be achieved
as a result of equivalent action by other States.
Also, while the FTT proposal has recourse to a contextual standard of the
kind highlighted in section 3, it does so in an entirely novel way. The
Commission’s proposal contains an “escape clause” which is contextual in
nature. Article 4(3) of the Commission’s proposal provides that:
“Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, a financial institution or a person who
is not a financial institution shall not be deemed to be established within the
meaning of those paragraphs, where the person liable for payment of the FTT
proves there is no link between the economic substance of the transaction and
the territory of the participating Member State.” Thus, liability to pay the tax
will be excluded when the conditions laid down in Article 4(3) are met. As
with the other contextual standards that the EU has relied on to delimit the
scope of its prescriptive jurisdiction (such as effects or anti-evasion), the
standard contained in Article 4(3) is open-ended and its application will
require careful assessment of the full set of circumstances surrounding the
transaction at hand. However, in contrast to the other examples set out above,
124. Regulation 236/2012 on short selling, cited supra note 65.
125. Steps are taken to exclude the possibility of double-taxation within the FTT zone but
not in relation to (financial) institutions from a non-participating Member State.
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the contextual standard embedded in Article 4(3) places the burden of
demonstrating that the criteria have been met not on the EU but on the
individual who, prima facie, is subject to EU law.
Furthermore, and by contrast with the EU’s Derivatives Regulation
(EMIR), the Commission proposal does not establish a governance framework
to facilitate further clarification and exemplification of the circumstances in
which the open-ended criteria laid down by the contextual standard will be
deemed to be met. It is for Member States, acting on a case-by-case basis, to
adjudicate on the claims arising under Article 4(3). Member States are not
even under an obligation to report to the Commission about how they have
exercised their discretion in this respect; either in relation to the procedures
that they have followed or in relation to the circumstances in which the
conditions laid down in Article 4(3) have been deemed to be met.
We will return to consider the legal salience of absent or inadequate safety
valves in the discussion of jurisdictional reasonableness in section 5 below.
5. Assessing the reasonableness of legislation incorporating novel
“extraterritorial” triggers
It is highly likely that the ECJwill in due course find it necessary to rule on the
legality of EU legislation incorporating novel “extraterritorial” jurisdiction
and to do so in the light of customary international law.126When this happens,
the ECJwill be confronted with a difficult task.While the bases of jurisdiction
recognized by customary international law are clearly established and
relatively stable, the boundaries and contours of these jurisdictional categories
are not. The categories of jurisdiction recognized by customary international
law are set out in the table below.127
126. The ECJ did not assess the legality of the ship-source pollution directive (Dir. 2005/35,
cited supra note 7) from the point of view of customary international law in Case C-308/06, R.
v. International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) & Others c. Secretary
of State for Transport, [2008] ECR I-4057.
127. For a good overview of customary international law in this area, including its
ambiguities in the light of international practice, see: International Bar Association, Report of
the taskforce on extraterritorial jurisdiction (IBA, 2009) and Lowe and Staker, op. cit. supra
note 35.
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Table III: Customary International Law Bases for the Exercise of
Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional Base Scope
Territorial Principle Jurisdiction over conduct within
territory, persons present within
territory (and conduct generating
effects within territory?)
Nationality/personality Active: Jurisdiction over nationals
(and residents?)
Passive: Jurisdiction over conduct
that harms nationals (and residents?)
Protective Principle Jurisdiction over conduct that
threatens a State’s vital interests
Universal Principle Jurisdiction over heinous crimes
that does not depend upon the
existence of a nexus with the State
We can illustrate the ambiguous boundaries of these jurisdictional bases by
reference to the territorial principle and in the light of the novel
“extraterritorial” triggers identified above:
Effects: While there is increasing acceptance that “the effects doctrine”
constitutes a form of territorial jurisdiction, its status and meaning remains
contested both as a matter of politics and law.128The Commission has recently
argued that the effects doctrine confers jurisdiction “over events that affect” a
State’s territory,129 but it has not been consistent on this point. In an amicus
curiae brief submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in the Kiobel case, the
Commission argued that effects-based jurisdiction remains controversial as a
matter of international law, although it did acknowledge that the territorial
principle has been expanded in some States to include extraterritorial conduct
that has or is intended to have substantial effects.130 As noted previously,
while the General Court has accepted that it may be lawful for the EU to rely
on the effects doctrine, where it is foreseeable that foreign conduct will have
128. Ibid., pp. 12–13.
129. Non-Paper by the Commission Services, “Response to the Opinion of the Legal
Service of the Council on the Legality of the Counterparty-Based Deemed Establishment of
Financial Institutions” (undated) at: <www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/
Pdfs/FTTECLegalOpinion.pdf>., para 7.
130. Amicus Curiae Brief by the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union
in Support of Neither Part in Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., fn. 28.
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an immediate and substantial effect within the EU,131 the Court of Justice has
yet to rule definitively on this point.
Anti-evasion: The relevance of territory to the functioning of the
anti-evasion trigger remains conspicuously unclear. This novel
“extraterritorial” trigger aims to ensure that a person does not construct
artificial arrangements that intrinsically lack a business rationale in order to
sever a jurisdictionally salient connectionwith the EU for the primary purpose
of avoiding obligations imposed by EU law. This is intended to prevent
regulatory arbitrage where this results from artificial arrangements of this
kind. It is far from straightforward in doctrinal terms to determine whether an
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction over persons who seek to evade
obligations in this way should be viewed as constituting an exercise of
territorial jurisdiction or not.
It would certainly be open to the ECJ to argue that where artificial
arrangements are used to evade a territorial trigger incorporated within EU
legislation, this should be viewed as an exercise of territorial jurisdiction.
Similarly, where artificial arrangements are used to evade a nationality trigger,
this should be viewed as an exercise of nationality jurisdiction. Equally,
however, it would be entirely plausible for the ECJ to consider that the
anti-evasion trigger is a free-standing trigger and that the premise that
underpins it (the existence of artificial arrangements which result in a person
evading obligations under EU law), is not territorial as such.
The Counterparty and Property Principles: Both the counterparty and
property principles result in the imposition of obligations on persons because
of the connection they have formed with a person or property with a strong
link to the EU. Consequently, obligations attach to persons who enjoy only an
indirect connection with the EU. This indirect connection may be based on
nationality (where the counterparty is an EU national) or on territory (where
the counterparty is present within the EU or where the property has a
territorial connection with the EU). Even where the indirect connection is
territorial, it is far from clear whether an indirect connection of this kind
should be viewed as falling within the boundaries of the territorial principle or
not.
Given the ambiguous boundaries of the jurisdictional bases recognized by
customary international law, including in particular the territorial principle,
the question of whether a measure falls within these bases will very often be a
question of judgement rather than a question of brute fact. While there are
heads of jurisdiction other than the territorial principle that could conceivably
be called in aid in a bid to justify EU recourse to novel “extraterritorial”
131. Recall the judgment of the General Court in Gencor, cited supra note 55 and the
discussion of related cases in supra note 60.
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triggers, it is important to bear inmind that the status of the passive personality
principle is contested as a matter of international law and that the protective
and universal principles have tended to be extremely restrictively defined.132
Consequently, in any legal appraisal of EU recourse to novel “extraterritorial”
triggers, the territorial principle will assume centre-stage.133
Various suggestions have been put forward to assist States and others in
appraising measures that may be thought to constitute an exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Prominent among these is the American Law
Institute’s 3rd Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law which sets out
“limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe”.134 Although there is considerable
merit in the “rule of reason” upon which the American Law Institute relies, it
nonetheless adopts an approach to the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction
which is simultaneously too narrow and too broad.
It is too narrow, on the one hand, because it suggests that a State should
refrain from exercising jurisdiction where this would give rise to a norm
conflict between two States and where another State clearly has a greater
interest in regulating the person or conduct at hand. In circumstances of
jurisdictional overlap and conflict, a balancing of State interests approach is
advocated with the result that the “winner takes all”. Here, a State may be
required to refrain from regulating even when this regulation is required to
protect important national or global interests, and regardless of the merits of
the regulation adopted by other States. On the other hand, the American Law
Institute’s guidance may be considered too broad because it lays down criteria
for evaluating the “reasonableness” of the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction
which focus virtually exclusively on the question of whether it is reasonable
for a State to act – as opposed to the question of whether it is reasonable for a
State to act in the manner it has, having regard to the design features of the
measure at hand.135
By contrast with this approach, experience on the ground in the EU is
suggestive of a different conception of jurisdictional reasonableness. This is
premised both upon an acceptance of the inevitability of concurrent or
132. Lowe and Staker, op. cit. supra note 35.
133. It would be possible to seek to justify the anti-evasion trigger on the basis of the
protective principle in that it seeks to prevent the legislative authority of the EU from being
undermined; and, at greater stretch, the counterparty trigger on the basis of the contested
passive personality principle in that it seeks to prevent harm to EU nationals and/or residents.
134. Restatement of the Law (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
para 403. For an excellent overview and critical analysis, and for many relevant references, see
Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, (OUP, 2008).
135. It can be argued that sub-sections d) and h) of para 403(1) of the Restatement (ibid.) are
concerned with the mode of regulating. Sub-section d) requires States to evaluate the existence
of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; sub-section g)
requires States to evaluate the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another State.
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overlapping jurisdiction (and I would argue a rejection of a balancing of State
interests approach);136 and upon a recognition of the importance of designing
legislative instruments with a view to eliminating unnecessary overlaps. From
this perspective, the inclusion of jurisdictional “safety valves” can play a
crucial role. Safety valves that serve to inject contingency and contextuality
into EU legislation incorporating novel “extraterritorial” triggers can be
viewed as contributing to jurisdictional reasonableness in circumstances in
which EU and third country assertions of jurisdiction have a strong potential
to overlap.
Like interest balancing, a conception of jurisdictional reasonableness that
attaches considerable weight to the existence and adequacy of safety valves
would comprise a relational component. This would imply that the EU has an
obligation to take into account equivalent or adequate legislation that has been
put in place by other States, and to “disapply” EU law where an entity has been
subject to equivalent or adequate legislation elsewhere. As experience shows,
an assessment of the equivalence or adequacy of third country legislation
necessitates intensive contacts between EU and third country authorities. The
resulting dialogue has the potential to prevent unnecessary duplication in the
application of laws and to facilitate regulatory learning, build trust and reduce
conflict between States.
A safety valve-focused conception of reasonableness would also serve to
imbue EU legislation with a dynamic quality. The inclusion of contextual
standards, whether as a trigger or as an “escape clause”, would serve to ensure
that the global reach of a given piece of legislation is subject to ongoing
adjustment as new factual scenarios emerge and as the regulator’s
understanding of what kinds of foreign conduct threaten the attainment of the
EU’s objectives improves. This is in keeping with the emphasis that the ECJ
has itself placed on the importance of maintaining the dynamic quality of
contextual standards and its finding in a different setting that it is unlawful for
136. This suggestion has much in common with Ryngaert’s arguments (op. cit. supra note
134) who also argues in favour of concurrent jurisdiction, albeit that his analysis still rests to a
greater extent on a balancing of State interests approach. Ryngaert considers that where the
State that enjoys the strongest nexus with a situation fails to act, other States should be allowed
to step in to take up this regulatory slack, at least insofar as the protection of global interests is
at stake. I do not think it is desirable or realistic to try to balance State interests in this way or to
refuse to countenance the possibility of a State exercising jurisdiction to protect its own interests
as opposed to the global interest. Hence, the emphasis that I am inclined to place on questions
of legislative design.
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aMember State to transform a contextual standard included in legislation into
a hard and fast rule.137
As an aside, where a contextual standard takes the form of a devolved
“escape clause”, as in the Commission’s proposal for a financial transaction
tax, it is critical that Member States be required to report to the Commission
on the manner in which this escape clause has been interpreted and applied.
This would enable the Commission to concretize and refine the contours of
the escape clause and perhaps even to adjust the definition of underlying
triggers where experience with the application of the escape clause suggests
that these are framed in a manner that is systematically too wide.
It is the argument of this paper that the inclusion of jurisdictional safety
valves in EU legislation incorporating novel “extraterritorial” triggers should
be required as a matter of EU law; subject perhaps to the legislature providing
a robust explanation as towhy the inclusion of safety valves of this kind would
threaten the attainment of the legislation’s objectives.
It is salient to note in the light of this that, in its legal opinion regarding the
proposed financial transaction tax, the Council did attach legal significance to
the absence and inadequacy of safety valves of precisely this kind. It criticized
the proposal on the basis that it made no provision for double-taxation relief
for (financial) institutions that are established outside the EU-11.138 As such,
it does not contain a mechanism to inject contingency into the measure
concerned.The Council Legal Service also criticized the design of the “escape
clause” included in the proposal, arguing that its lack of clarity and the high
level of autonomy that it granted to Member States could be anticipated to
generate disparity in the application of the Directive and to create a real risk of
litigation and legal insecurity.139 Indeed, while the Council Legal Service talks
the talk of an “interest balancing” approach in its legal opinion, it never gets to
the stage of actually balancing the EU interests against the interests of third
countries, because it condemns the proposal on a range of different grounds,
including the absence and inadequacy of the jurisdictional safety valves laid
down.
137. Case C-70/00,Commission v. Spain [2004] ECR I-7999, para 33, where the ECJ stated
that a contextual trigger in the form of a “close connection” test could be implemented by
Member States through recourse to presumptions, but that it could not be circumscribed by
predetermined criteria.
138. Non-Paper by the Commission Services, cited supra note 129, para 30; albeit that the
Council’s criticisms on this point were framed in the language of discrimination between
EU-11 and non-EU-11 entities.
139. Ibid., para 25.
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6. Conclusion
This paper has focused on the choice of triggers in EU legislation,
exemplifying the diversity and dynamic nature of EU legislative practice in
this respect.We have seen the emergence of new heads of jurisdiction and the
emergence of novel categories of jurisdiction as well. An awareness of this
rich variety helps to guard against the danger that the deeply political act of
selecting or designing a legislative trigger remains shrouded in a veil of almost
technocratic inevitability. Even where no allegations of “extraterritoriality”
arise, the EU’s choice of trigger bears deeply on the distribution of the burden
of complying with EU law and on how easy this burden is to evade. It also
impacts significantly upon how great a contribution a measure may make to
the attainment of its stated objectives as well as upon the distribution of the
benefits that flow from EU law.
As the examples referred to in section 2.1. show, controversy can arise even
in relation to triggers that fall within conventional jurisdictional categories
(conduct, nationality and presence). This is particularly the case where the
trigger implies a fleeting or attenuated connection with the EU,140 or where
measure in question gives rise to territorial extension because a territorial
trigger is used to gain leverage over conduct occurring abroad.141
The focus of this paper has been on novel “extraterritorial” triggers
included in EU legislation. These serve to expand the global reach of EU law
and can result in non-EU persons incurring obligations under EU law in
relation to activities that take place entirely abroad. EU measures that
incorporate these triggers – which include for example effects, anti-evasion,
the counterparty principle or the property principle – are situated within a
contested transition zone between the territorial and the extraterritorial, and
consequently their compatibility with the territorial principle recognized by
customary international law is a question of judgement and debate.
This paper has also laid emphasis on the fact that EU legislation that
incorporates novel “extraterritorial” triggers frequently includes
jurisdictional safety valves that are intended to prevent jurisdictional
over-reach and to increase cooperation and avoid conflict with other States.
The application of EU legislation is frequently rendered “contingent” because
the EU exhibits a willingness to step back when foreign conduct has been
regulated adequately by other States. The application of EU legislation is
140. See e.g. Joined Cases C-446/09 & C-495/09, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v.
Lucheng Meijing Industrial Co. Ltd et al and Nokia Corporation v. HM Commissioners of
Revenue and Customs, [2011] ECR I-12435, concerning the seizure of goods in transit within
the EU on the basis that they were suspected of infringing intellectual property rights protected
in the EU.
141. See e.g. ATAA, cited supra note 6 and Google Spain, cited supra note 46.
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sometimes “contextual” in that certain of the novel “extraterritorial” triggers
relied on by the EU take the form of contextual standards rather than hard and
fast rules. This would include the anti-evasion trigger and effects. These
contextual standards place a continuing duty of reasoned justification on the
EU which is required to demonstrate why the specific foreign conduct meets
the context-sensitive standard laid down.
This paper has argued that the inclusion of safety valves of this kind may be
necessary to ensure the reasonableness, and ultimately the legality, of EU
measures that incorporate novel “extraterritorial” triggers. Consistent with
this, the reasonableness of these measures should not be appraised exclusively
by reference to the triggers that they incorporate or by assessing the balance of
interests between the EU and third States. On the contrary, those charged with
entering the tricky terrain between territorial and extraterritorial legislation
should have regard to the design features of the legislation in question and, in
particular, the adequacy of the safety valves that it puts in place. Viewed from
this perspective, the Commission’s current proposal for a financial
transaction tax is flawed.
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